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An attempt is made to embed the study of political terrorism within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action. It is suggested that the analysis of dynamics within and between components of Collective Action—structure of conflict, a social movement, authorities, and contention—can be beneficial for gaining additional insights into the study of group risk for political terrorism. Using the case of the Tanzim contention with Israeli forces it is demonstrated how processes within, between, and outside the conflictants affected Tanzim members' decision to employ political terrorism. Based on the analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered.
A shorter version of this article which was part of a collection of essays published by IOS Press was presented at the “Advanced Research Workshop,” sponsored by NATO, Konstanz, Germany, 15–18 April 2005. The author thanks participants of the workshop for their useful comments.
Notes
1. To ease communication with readers, the author uses the term “terrorist group” both for groups that already employ terrorism and for groups that are at risk for terrorism. Although being aware of the oversimplification of the term, as the group is being characterized only in relation to one aspect of its operation or its features, the double meaning of the term is useful for the purpose of this article: to analyze the shift to political terrorism.
2. The Islamic Jihad in Palestine (PIJ) was not only smaller and less influential compared to the Hamas, but also as of 1988 shifted its center of operation to Lebanon and Syria following a heavy crackdown by Israel. For a systematic analysis of the Isalmic Jihad see: M. Hatina, 2001).
3. Palestine Times, issue 106, April 2000, available at (http://www.ptimes.org/issue106/index). Last accessed 29 February 2004.
4. In English the Wall Mountain: Palestinian lands south to Jerusalem confiscated already in 1991.
5. Indeed, according to results of a public poll conducted by the Palestinian Jerusalem Media and Communication Center in June 2000, administered among 1,200 respondents randomly sampled, Arafat's situation and the PA's popularity were at an all-time low. The main results reveal that only 31 percent of the respondents said they trust Arafat as their leader (33 percent said they trust nobody), approximately 40 percent said they are not satisfied with the performance of the PA, and about 90 percent believed there is corruption within the PA's institutions in varying degrees.
6. Available at (http://www.palestinianfacts.org), “Start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000,” last accessed 22 October 2004.