Abstract
Nuclear power plants and research reactors are vulnerable to acts of sabotage and to terrorist attacks that could breach safety systems and result in releases of substantial amounts of radioactivity. In addition, with expanding civil commerce in weapon‐usable forms of plutonium and uranium, and with the vast numbers of tactical nuclear weapons stored in areas of intense terrorist activity, it is also plausible that terrorists could build or steal a weapon or carry out a credible hoax.
As terrorist groups become more determined, more violent and more technologically advanced, the possibility of nuclear terrorism increases. The potential for nuclear terrorism should be a matter of special concern for Western Europe because of the possible interaction between a high level of “nuclearization” and a high level of terrorist activity by sophisticated groups operating across national boundaries.
Potential risks and corrective measures are discussed here, based on the report of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, on policy and technical studies prepared for the Task Force, and on related research conducted by the sponsoring organization, the Nuclear Control Institute. Some of the proposed measures have the added benefit of providing further protection against the consequences of natural disasters, and human error, as well as sabatoge.